3:Nash E-5 (1964-1965)1967
NV9 Tzeltal NV9
[P 465-A] Teklum

only a rise in the tensions that provoke conflict, but an undermining of the social-control mechanisms for channeling them. The perception of these changes by the members of the society makes for shifts in the individual calculi, grossly measured in changes in the rate of behavior. In order to understand the interrelated problems of the sources of the increasing tensions and the reasons homicide is chosen as a means of resolving them, I have reconstructed the course of social change in the period from 1935 to 1965.

Increasing Social Tensions

New economic enterprises have increased wealth differences in the community. The best measure of this is in the increase in cattle-holding, which is a socially approved way of spending money. Twenty-five years ago, there were only a half-dozen men with cattle, and they had only one or two head each. Today, one of the herders in the community has 200 head of cattle, and 75 percent of the households have one or more each.

Cattle-herding is a "new" industry in the sense that instead of just having a team of oxen to help with agricultural labor, men are breeding cattle for profit. Because the cattle roam freely, there is much loss, and this leads to accusations of theft. I have never heard such accusations directed against anyone outside the community; crime as well as positive moral relationships is confined within the boundaries of this corporate community. Suspected cattle thieves are killed by the cattle-owner or by a killer hired by the cooperative of cattle-owners. Such killings account for six of the 37 cases analyzed above (Table 1).

The illicit distilling of liquor has also added to the town's prosperity. The liquor industry was introduced about 15 years ago, but the number of distillers has increased from 5 to 40 in the last five years. From an enterprise formerly meeting only local market needs, contraband liquor is now sold as far away as the coastal area and across the border in Guatemala. A cooperative of distillers has reduced the frictions that immediately followed the introduction of liquor-distilling. The cooperative pays the fines of any member caught distilling, and in addition threatens to use group action against informers, who were formerly tempted to earn the 200 pesos offered by federal agents. But the envy aroused by the sight of those who profit from this enterprise,

3:Nash E-5 (1964-1965)1967
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as with the cattle industry, is a covert cause for personal attacks on other grounds.

A third enterprise, trucking, has caused a realignment of political interests in factions associated with two truck-owning cooperatives. Membership in one of the cooperatives, or patronage of one of the two trucks, arouses the enmity of members of the other cooperative. Several threats have been made on the lives of the owners and the operators, but the only damage done has been to tires.

The tensions resulting from the introduction of these new enterprises cannot be fully measured by the deaths attributed to direct economic conflict. Wealth differences resulting from the new enterprises excite envy, and with it come accusations of witchcraft. In this community, witchcraft killing does not perform the normative function of reducing wealth differentiation that Kluckhohn saw operating among the Navaho (1944), since it is the poor man who is killed as a witch, not the rich man. The slaying of the envious witch exacerbates the economic differentiation that provides the seedbed for conflict.

Another new source of tension is found in the growing demand for political leadership or even independence from the township by the *ejido* colonies formed since land reform went into effect in 1937. The inept maneuvers of two founders of the ejido colonies in hot country resulted in two homicides (cases 12 and 18 in Table 1).[4] The increasing strength of these hamlets will mean that more attempts will be made in the future to gain political equality and/or independence. Whether this will result in increasing homicides will depend on social-control agencies external to the Indian communities.

Homicide occurring as a direct result of economic and political competition represents a new strategy in the community. The decision to kill rather than to use other negative sanctions is related to the social-control mechanisms discussed below.

Changing Mechanisms of Social Control

A system of social control rests not only on the exercise of negative sanctions, but on the sense of personal security derived from confidence in the institutions of control. In Teklum, the maintenance of control was formerly centered in the guardianship against malevolent spirits held by the ancestor spirits and the curers. The "police force," made up of ten

4: Villa Rojas E-4, 5 (1938-1944) 1969
NV9 Tzeltal NV9

443 ket of Tenejapa. Other commercial centers are Ocosingo, Chilon, and Yajalon in the north. These markets are also frequented by Ladinos, but others, located far from the cabecera, are exclusively for Indians. The most important of them is the Saturday market of Yochib near Tenejapa, Cancuc, and Oxchuc. It draws 300–400 natives, who arrive at dawn carrying agricultural and handcraft products. Most people come from 8 to 10 in the morning, after which they begin to depart; about 2 or 3 P.M. only those staying to drink chicha are left. Transactions [439] are paid in trade or in money.

Wage Work

464 Because the cold climate and the rugged topography of the region produce little corn, the natives must work periodically as day laborers on the coffee plantations of the Soconusco area on the Pacific coast. About 7000 Tzeltal and a few more Tzotzil work there each year. Natives may go to the coffee plantations any time of the year but prefer to do so during the months the milpa requires less attention (either after planting or after harvest). Between Yajalon and Ocosingo are plantations where men from the neighboring villages are hired for short periods.

Use of Wealth

556 578 829 183 Because of their social organization, it is very difficult for these Indians to accumulate wealth. The worst sin an individual can commit against the community is to store up crops, domestic animals, or clothes, or simply to build a better house. Whatever [754] raises an individual above his fellows—buying a new house, improving an old one, buying a horse—can cause in them a deep fear of being the target of witchcraft (Villa Rojas, 1947).

556 829 183 Those who, enjoying good health, are able to pile up some wealth, are obliged by the community to spend it in banquets and amusements for the community. It is believed that the old men and principales

[P. 213-A]

556 829 183 know, with the aid of the *naguales* (supernatural spirits), about the wealth each member of the group has; those who have more than necessary must pay for the expenses of fiestas, etc.

Social Organization

Kinship

614 613 The basic elements of the clan system of the ancient Maya can still be found in the most conservative groups. At the present time, the kinship system is divided into patrilineal clans, which are divided into [199] patrilineages. In some cases, the name of the clan is of Spanish origin, the name of the lineage, of indigenous origin. In Oxchuc there are six clans whose names are: Gómez, Santis, López, Méndez, Encines, and Rodríguez. The first two clans are the largest, since the Gómez clan has 37 lineages, the Santis 39. The last two are almost disappearing as they have only one or two lineages. Among the indigenous names for lineages are: Ichilok, Nimail, Akux, Cojton, Chic, Molox, Nich, Antun, Chisná, Tíb, and Mulesh. These designate names of animals, plants, or objects.

A man whose name is Juan Gómez Nich, for example, belongs to the Gómez clan and to the Nich lineage. Generally, the name of the lineage is enough to show to which clan somebody belongs; if his name is Juan Nich, it is immediately known that he is from the Gómez clan. This special characteristic of the indigenous name is designated by the word *Jol s'bij*, which means 'head of the name.'

[184] In Cancuc (a community next to Oxchuc) clans have special names, such as Chík, Chejeb, Ijká, and Boj. If the indigenous name is known, the clan name is self-evident. The Spanish name has lost its specific function, and, according to Guiteras Holmes (1947, pp. 4–5), there are Indians who do not even remember it. However, the Spanish surname designates exogamic units of a patrilineal type throughout the region, without

[P. 213-B]
[Text continues on p. 214-B]

273* proper interpretations of drinking behavior can only proceed as rapidly as careful descriptions of drinking behavior are formulated. Drinking performances anywhere in the world occur in more or less well defined contexts which are subject to well ordered descriptions. One cannot judge any individual's drinking performances until and unless he has discovered the contextual rules in terms of which this individual is operating. It has [121] been the intent of this thesis to point to some of these kinds of contextual rules.

273* In Aguacatenango drinking performances reflect important 554 principles of social organization which are elsewhere attested in other performances which are not drinking performances. In drinking performances there is a simultaneous mapping of differences in social status and role as there is a statement of how the wealth in the community should be divided. In any drinking [561] performance, men of senior age and generation drink first, their juniors drinking later. Women and children drink separately and in small amounts. While the relative order of drinking marks the relative status of the men present, all men drink the same amount. Not only does this clearly delineate men's and women's roles but it also expresses the condition that across time, every man can expect to occupy a status position senior to the one he presently has. Such changes in status are not dependent [556] upon the achievement of great wealth since everyone should have

273 554 556 this in equal amounts (as mapped by the equal amounts of aguardiente they receive). In fact, as we have earlier observed, drinking performances are regularly scheduled, explicitly verbalized events in which differences in real wealth are leveled.

121 The ethnographic aims of this thesis may be summed up more or less as follows. It is clear, now, that it is possible to describe systems within culture in terms relevant and significant to those who are participants in that culture. This thesis has aimed to formulate such a description of drinking behavior in Aguacatenango. The procedures we have discussed in the earlier chapters are general in the sense that they are, it now appears to us, applicable to any culture, and to most foci or domains therein. One should not be surprised, however, if some varieties of learned behavior are not directly accessible to study in this fashion.

000 Though some notions from structural linguistics seem relevant, the immediate relevance of linguistic data is as an aid in discovering and relating other cultural patterns. McQuown's reading of Whorf's (1941) statement regarding "fashions of speaking" seems relevant here: "This approach [Whorf's] would seem to de-emphasize the role of linguistic patterns as such and to stress the function of language as a medium for the manifestation of other cultural patterns, in which precise formal characteristics of the medium were merely limiting and not determining

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
Amatenango del Valle

776 which have the power to mislead, give illness, or capture people to work [756] for them. Only the most powerful curers and witches, and the very greedy [754] approach these spirits for they are reputed to be very "live" and mali- [825] ciously clever. Snakes are the offspring of the hill and do the bidding of the hill-owners.

556 Wealth in the form of livestock, corn, or gold can be gained from some 756 of the cave owners upon request, but there is danger in receiving these 778 gifts since they must be reciprocated. Among the cave owners who give 787 gifts is Don Klabil, a deceased moneylender of the neighboring town. After his death in the 1940s, his spirit went to live in the hill bordering the two towns. People say that when he was alive he used to get money from the true owner of the cave. Those who have been inside the cave say it is filled with animals—cattle, horses, rabbits—which drink at a large interior lake. The appropriate approach for requesting wealth is to go on Thurs- [782] day, "when the earth is open," and burn candles and incense. When the request is granted, the recipient must light candles at the cave every Thursday, and after his death he must work forever for the cave owner. It is said that at his death his wealth dies with him—usually all has been spent, and in fact children are left poor. Some say the spirit of the firstborn child of the recipient must be given to the owner to work for him. For this reason, there is no envy felt by neighbors when they see the increasing wealth of a man who has visited the caves and received such gains and he is doubly protected because no one can hurt an "enchanted man" (one who has entered the cave) with witchcraft.

756 Ladinos' belief in the cave owners gives support to the Indians' credence 776 in their power. Ladinos inquire of Indians where they can find treasures. 778 Once the request to the hill owners is made, it is essential to follow [829] through correctly. Everyone in town knows the story of Martin Bautista, a curer who went to speak to the true owner of the hill in which Don Klabil lives.

[539] *He knew how to talk to the owner. The owner told him that at midnight on the following day, he would give him what he wanted. At midnight Maria, his wife, was alone in the house. She heard a noise and the sound of* "Andale, burro!" *Then there was a knock at the door. When the*

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
Amatenango del Valle

When this fails, they turn to the professional help of lawyers rather than to the old caciques with whom they had formerly maintained patron-client relations. The traditional structural alignment of upper and lower barrios is retained as the basis for organizing the growing cattle herds, but the cooperative provides flexibility and power for developing new enterprises.

The minimal changes in the material environment and the technology of the peasantry are countered by the development of social resources which should facilitate Indian integration in the wider society. In operating the new enterprises independently of Ladino control, they are developing entrepreneurial skills and an awareness of the relationship between capital and profit. The restriction of their operations to nonproductive use of capital for profit, such as buying crops at harvest and reselling as the price rises, reveals the limited dynamics of intracommunal development. The town will look to the regional and national networks for fundamental changes in its economy.

The fear of exciting envy acts as a brake on productive activity and the enjoyment of improved consumption resulting from wealth. Santos' death is a symbolic warning to others who would follow in his footsteps. An earlier case occurred when the ejido land grants were made in the 30s:

The brothers Ča?iletik became "very rich" as a result of careful operation of their ejido and privately owned land. They owned ten pair of oxen and about fifty horses. When they brought in their crops on horseback, it looked like a line of ants. They built a good house in Alkob', and a good threshing shelter. The people of the town began to talk about getting them off the land. The ejido commissioner took their land away and turned it over to others in the town. Until this day, the brothers Ča?iletik are without land. Now they do no more than work like other men. They live poorly. All their cattle and horses are sold.

The organization of the cooperatives is one means of diverting envy directed against individuals and permitting some increase in productive efforts, but the society still lacks the means of validating higher consumption standards. The richest man in town eats better than his neighbors,

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
Amatenango del Valle

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626 but his style of living is indistinguishable from theirs. The only difference
[23] is the larger number of dogs he[1] keeps to guard his wealth stored in the form of surplus crops in the eaves of his house.

177
178 The kind of economic change occurring in Tzo'ontahal fits the model
433 of a moving equilibrium. Tightly controlled behavioral schema preserve
434 the traditional productive activities in pottery and agriculture. They pro-
621 vide the framework into which the new enterprises are fit. Increasing de-
323 pendence of cosumption choices on external markets is slowly transforming the content but not the pattern of community life. This kind of change is limited to societies that form a distinct corporate group. In an open society where many alternatives are available, the painful process of accommodation of the new to a customary pattern would probably not be undertaken given the tendency for social change to follow the course of least resistence. The absorption of economic innovation in Tzo'ontahal illustrates the ability of closed corporate communities to participate in commercial undertakings and reformulate them to fit their own pattern.

[1] [i.e., the richest man in town. - Analyst]

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970

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TABLE 25. Number of Civil and Religious Offices of Household Heads over 50 Years of Age as Related to Wealth

Age of household head	Wealth: Land in hectares	Wealth: Head of cattle	No. of civil offices	No. of religious offices
54	3	4	5	3
55	3	8	2	3
65	3	11	6	2
50	2½	2	4	4
75	2½	4	6	6
55	2	8	2	4
55	2		4	3
60	2	2	2	4
65	2		6	6
75	2	7	4	3
78	2	6	2	1
50	2½	2	3	4
50	1½	2	6	5
55	1½	6	2	6
58	1½		1	2
60	1½		6	6
60	1½	4	4	4
60	1½	8	4	5
80	1½		4	5
88	1½	7	6	6
50	1	10	2	3
50	1	1	3	3
54	1	4	6	6
54	1	4	6	6
55	1	6	2	3
56	1	4	3	3
58	1		5	4
60	1	1	5	6
60	1	2	5	6
60	1	2	4	6
65	1	2	3	
65	1		6	6
65	1		3	3
70	1		1	1
75	1		5	5
79	1		5	5
80	1	2	3	
80	1	22	3	1
85	1	6	6	6

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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Age of household head	Wealth: Land in hectares	Wealth: Head of cattle	No. of civil offices	No. of religious offices
55	½		2	2
55	½		2	2
55	½	2	2	3
60	½		2	3
60	½		1	3
60	½		4	3
62	½	1	2	3
65	½		2	3
65	½	4	4	6
65	½		6	5
75	½		5	6
87	½		4	4

from six to five. The reason given for this is that there are more people now than formerly.

The second course of civil careers is to serve as síndico and go on to president, bypassing the intermediate and lower posts of the hierarchy and never filling the higher traditional posts. Of seven who have served as president, two served as síndico, two had no previous office, and three had been both policeman and síndico (Table 25). None of the former-presidents served in any civil post after being president. Two served as fiscal in their religious careers and had had no other religious service. This is the course pursued by literate men who speak Spanish well. An alternative course is to enter the ejido commission as secretary, treasurer, or president and then serve as síndico, or even directly as president. The president elected in 1964 had served only on the ejido commission. This caused some discontent, but not enough to prevent his election.

The household head enters religious office first as *nič'nal* or junior mayordomo, then serves as *?ali?bal,* or assistant, next as *tatil,* or elder mayordomo of a lesser saint. The fourth position is tatil of San Pedro, after which comes *kobraria,* or cofrade, first of San Francisco, then of Santa Lucía or Sacramento. Following his appointment as tatil of San Pedro, the incumbent holds the first gathering of mayordomos in his house. When he completes his term in this office, he may be called upon by neighbors, relatives, and compadres to serve as nakawane in household ceremonials. He

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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794 may at any time in his career be called upon as alférez. This may occur
[625] even before he has served as a junior mayordomo or policeman since the
[556] post depends on his own or his father's wealth.

621 The normal career of an official in the traditional hierarchy involves a
794 balance of civil and religious posts. A man enters these posts according to
561 convenience, not in a rigid alternation between civil and religious wings. The rough balancing of posts can be seen in the careers of men over fifty in Table 25. According to informants, a man should start and end his career in the religious wing. By the age of thirty, forty-three men had filled at least one post in the religious hierarchy, and only twenty-four men had served in the civil hierarchy (Table 24). The religious posts are considered less onerous than the civil posts since the incumbents are in attendance only one day a week instead of every day, and their terms in office last only six months.

621 Wealth level, except in cases of extreme poverty, does not limit a man's
794 participation in the traditional hierarchy. Of fourteen men over seventy,
556 eight had completed their civil posts and seven their religious posts. Three who had not followed the traditional career lines had served as president. The town is small enough so that career lines have not followed any polarization of the upper levels of the hierarchy as occurs in towns of larger size (Bunzel 1952, Camara 1952, Cancian 1965). Discrimination is based on residence rather than wealth—those Indians who reside in barrios and colonias cannot reach any post higher than that of assistant judge. Wealth level is a factor, however, in the time span of the individual's career, since at some time before becoming second or first regidor he must have filled the expensive post of alférez. Table 25 lists the careers of men fifty years of age and over in order of wealth. It is possible to finish a career in office by the age of fifty, but if a man has less than one hectare of land, it is unlikely that he will finish before he is sixty-five. The Indians of Tzo'ontahal do not however maximize the importance of passing through the hi-
[554] erarchy. It is a duty not a goal, and the reward in prestige is minimal.

794 The only post in which wealth has been crucial was that of alférez. The
556 incumbent and the household of which he was a member spent 3,000 pesos
796 to carry out the fiestas with which he was charged in his year in office.
666 The president, the four judges, and the four regidores chose the alférez

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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shortly before the fiesta of the saint's day with which he was charged. When the nomination was made, the president sent out the first policeman with the chief policeman to bring the man chosen to the town hall. They expected, and were always confronted with, resistance to the nomination. In order to gain acceptance they got the nominee drunk in a drinking session at the town hall. Liquor was measured out, and all the officials drank only a half cup at each round, but the new alférez was required to drink a full cup. The rounds continued until the new alférez was drunk. If he did not accept at this session, he was put in jail to think it over. Another drinking session took place the following day.

Nomination to the post of alférez was the only situation in which the jail penalty has been brought into effect, since refusal by nominees to other posts simply means that the officials "look for someone else." The reason given for invoking the punishment was "we know he has the wealth and therefore he should serve." Until 1965 the town had always succeeded in recruiting two of the alfereces from Ahk'olnantik and two from Alannantik. Since the upper division of Ahk'olnantik has grown at a more rapid rate than the lower division, candidates were found only in Ahk'olnantik. This unbalancing of the population ratios undermined the institution of alférez, which had always been the most unpopular position. When I returned to the field in 1967, it had been eliminated.

The Functions of Civil Officials

An analysis of the formally prescribed functions of the civil officials must take into account three sources of data: the functions as prescribed by state legislation, the functions as understood by local officials, and the observed activities of the officials. Table 26 compares the functions of officials as stated in the constitution of the state of Chiapas (Secretaría del Gobierno Departmental de Chiapas, 1828: Decreto 52, Nov. 30, 1825) [3] to statements of informants and to my observations of the carrying out of their official obligations.

3. I have chosen this constitution as the first post-independence statement of the status of local civil administrators.

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
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The principle of balancing posts according to residence in the dual division is maintained in the traditional civil posts but fails to be effective again in the case of the president. Increasing population in the upper division meant that the expensive post of alférez had to be filled primarily from the side with the highest population. This unbalancing of the sharing of these burdensome posts eventually led to revolt and the post was abolished. Since it was the key post in learning prayers, its loss may mean the end of the traditional rituals in the home.

The hierarchy fails to provide sufficient prestige or power to motivate people voluntarily to undertake some posts. The most vulnerable post was that of alférez. In fulfilling obligations to the saints, alfereces used to spend over 3,000 pesos, twice the normal income of a man in one year. They were assisted by members of their immediate households either in loans or in the sale of pottery to help pay for the house fiestas. The show of wealth at these fiestas, when up to one hundred guests were fed, excited the envy of neighbors, often among the invited guests. It was felt that this provoked witchcraft, and every former alférez I knew maintained that he suffered some catastrophe following his year in office. In the last few years before its demise in 1966 the post was accepted only under duress, and all those who had been nominated at first chose to go to jail. The reason that it survived as long as it did was the insistence of those officials who served in this post that it was essentail to maintaining good fiestas. The resolution of the contradictions by abolishing the post contrast with that of Zinacantan, where men sought the prestige-conferring posts that involved large expenditures of money as a validation of wealth (Cancian 1965).

Another contradition which minimizes the motivation to undertake the traditional posts is that the highest post in the ladder, that of principal, is one associated with embarrassment and shame rather than prestige. Shorn of his roles in decision-making and in guarding public funds, the principal is reduced to holding the plate in which donations for the major fiestas are placed. The ceremonial role of the principales will probably survive, however, since the old men of the community who have retired from active work in the fields enjoy the drinking sessions in the cabildo sufficiently to compensate for the shame associated with the role.

The internal structural contradictions have to be considered in the con-

7: Nash E-5 (1957-1967) 1970 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
Amatenango del Valle

621 593 581 794 Familial role requirements must be fulfilled in order for public roles to be undertaken. A man must be married in order to enter into even the lowest posts in the civil and religious hierarchies.

794 556 434 554 Only in the case of the alfereces has wealth ever been a criterion for recruitment. These four officials had to be able to spend 3,000 pesos during their year in office. The heavy expenditures failed to give prestige to the official, and the display of wealth excited envy rather than respect. The result was that people called upon to accept the post had to be imprisoned before they would accept.

554 756 Recruitment to roles in almost all institutional contexts is based on innate qualities; special skills and knowledge are attributes acquired in office or other role positions rather than requirements for undertaking roles. Curers are recruited because they are recognized as having an animal spirit; they learn whatever skills are required after they have been initiated into the profession. The curers' special position in the society rests more on esoteric powers than on esoteric knowledge. Everyone in the community [298] knows the herbs and medicines which are prescribed, and most men can give as comprehensive a taxonomy of illnesses as any practicing curer.

868 241 [859] [883] Economic roles, though largely undifferentiated for each sex, are consciously learned and transmitted. Boys accompany their fathers or elder brothers to the field at about the age of eight and continue working with them until they reach independence. Observation of behavior alone would seem to indicate an unconscious absorption of the role of agricultural worker, but informants recount episodes in which training in field work was explicitly transmitted by their fathers or brothers, and formal approval of their ability to do the tasks announced to their mothers. Parents express fear that school attendance not only interferes with working in the [871] milpa, but that it will cause the child to forget what he has learned in the field. Regardless of what other tasks a man performs, he thinks of himself as a farmer.

868 323 Becoming a potter requires an even more explicit training procedure. The fine linguistic segmentation of each act and movement in the schedule of pottery-making is a clue to the explicit transmission of tasks by the

682
been made, there is no recourse but to kill the man since he may retaliate 683
by killing his accuser (this occurred in two of the cases noted in Table 29).

Conflict between generations in the role sets father/son and father/son- 593
in-law stems from delay in carrying out role responsibilities. Fathers are 606
expected to provide the money for the costs of betrothal, and to give their 578
children shares of the patrimony including both land and livestock. The [584]
scheduling of when this should occur is often a matter of dispute, result- [425]
ing in at least two cases of homicide in the period analyzed.

New economic enterprises have exacerbated the tensions rising from 152
envy. Foster (1965) has suggested that envy stems from the notion of the 156
"limited good," requiring the strategy of a "zero sum game" (Bennet 178
1966). The fact that the new wealth is evidence of new opportunities, not 556
a subtraction from a given resource supply, has not entered the cognitive 754
awareness of the people. The prospering leaders of these enterprises feel themselves to be particularly vulnerable to the envy of others and thus to the charge of witchcraft. There have been several open attacks on new [474]
leaders accused as witches; the leader of the truck cooperative, for exam- [685]
ple, was murdered in 1966. Six men have been killed as cattle thieves in the past ten years.

The economic roles created with the introduction of new enterprises 177
have not been integrated in the traditional pattern of recruitment and con- 178
trol. In the association of cattle breeders, leadership tends to be based on 554
the size of the herd; in the case of the truck cooperative, amount of capital 621
invested and entrepreneurial skills have determined the leadership of the enterprise, while driving skill and ability to get along in the Ladino world has been the basis for choice of drivers. Such achievement principles as the basis for recruitment into these envied positions are not accepted in the same way that age and passage through a hierarchy of posts validated higher positions in the old hierarchies. The conspicuous expenditure of [556]
wealth in the more expensive posts in the religious hierarchy has also [194]
failed to lessen hostility aroused by the increasing disparity in wealth, and [754]
in fact those who have served as alférez have been even more subject to witchcraft aroused by envy.

621 his children, nor can he keep control of village affairs after his year of service has been fulfilled. Even a man occupying a post of high responsibility and prestige, a juez (judge) for example, becomes just an ordinary citizen after he leaves the office. All the men in the village theoretically, and most of them in practice, become village officers at some time in their life.

An individual starts at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder in the cargo of policía (also called mayor, topil or comisariado), which is a messenger or cleaning and errand boy for both the Mayordomos and Cabildo members. (He is the hands and feet [581] of the government.) The only requirement for this job is to be married. After this position has been "passed," a man is ready to start climbing the ladder to higher officerships, if he fulfills [581] the other requirements. He must have a child, a wife, and the [556] money which he is compelled to spend as part of the job: new clothes, liquor, and perhaps money to pay other men to help him with the agricultural work to which he cannot, being an officer, dedicate his full time.

During his life time, a man is required to pass a certain number of positions in the government, alternating Church and Ayuntamiento posts with rest periods of between one and three 62 years. After he passes the required number of officerships, and 887 by then he would be an old man, he becomes, automatically, a 888 pasado (a man that has passed his service), and can retire to private life, or become a principal, a member of the Elders' Council, a "father of the town." The Principales are the elder men in the village, highly respected for their wisdom and sought

621 the outside world, from which, from the community point of view, come the threats to the individual Indian, his family and to the village as a unit.

The mechanisms employed for the preservation of the village as an Indian corporate community are the wealth leveling devices and the sanctioning system described below.

556 Economic Mechanisms

The villagers aim at a better subsistence level, but not at capital reinvestment, and wealth does not command prestige in [433] itself. Extreme wealth differences are not likely to occur because, on the one hand, the marginality of land limits the productive power of the villager, and the low level technology: machete, digging stick, and wooden plow (the last only used in the 621 flat bottom land) limits production and also capital increase. On 423 the other hand, accumulation of land is limited by the Ayuntamiento having control of the ultimate disposal of free land within the community. Therefore, although there is some variation in the amount or variety of land held by a family, for the community as a whole there is a clear tendency toward an equalitarian distribution of parcels, so that in gross terms every household head controls agricultural plots of similar size and quality to every other agriculturalist. (Each household controls land both in cold and hot country, both irrigated and temporal and of equivalent quality.) It is difficult to ascertain the size of each 423 433 particular holding because the people do not think in terms of the size of the parcel itself, but in terms of the amount of grain

423 necessary to plant it. In some land more seed is necessary, so a
433 tablón, a measure of how much seed is planted in a parcel, tends to be about a hectare, but can also be irregular in shape or somewhat larger or smaller.

434 Ideological and Sanctioning Mechanisms

Even if a domestic group manages to accumulate profits from the extra work of its members, the forced assumption of fiesta obligations and cargos (Officerships) inhibits capital accumulation and redistributes the profits back into the community in the form of consumable goods: food, alcohol, cohetes, etc.
621 The assumption of the cargos requires a certain amount of capital
556 to spend on the expenses attached to the post, so it is likely that a household head who has managed to save some extra money is going to be called to perform his duties as an officer rather than the other men with less wealth and equal qualifications.

621 In terms of economic and political bases for differentiation, then, the communities are egalitarian. Villagers insist that everybody is just like everybody else: "we are all equal, we all follow the customs, we are all poor, we are all agriculturalists,
621 we are all Indians, just the same," they say. Nevertheless, they
183 would also admit that some people are good and some "have bad hearts," and therefore would not follow the customs, or would try to become richer by getting involved in economic enterprises which are not Indian (such as buying or selling for high profit, or lending money, or becoming store clerks). They would imitate the Ladinos in their speech, dress or their house layout, become "alzados"

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578 small; you will leave having paid five or ten pesos. You will forgive each other. If the misdeed is large, then you will give twenty-five or thirty pesos as your fine, so that we can give something to him who has been injured by you. We will cure him, so that he gets well, so that he may not die. Then he also will give pardon. But if we do not cure him, if we do not give medicine to the one you have hit, then you will quarrel, then his heart will be angered. Because here we have two kinds of misdeeds. He who is evil will do [754] witchcraft. He who does not know witchcraft will give pardon. But he who is evil if he sends sickness to you, then if you get sick, if you die, it is because you did not obey the commandment.

I say this because I am a principal, I am a father [of the town]. I advise you so that the town will go forth in happiness, and in happiness we will increase in our gatherings in the town. But if you are evil, we will not increase, our children will not grow, because there are evil people, there is sickness, there is death from him who knows witchcraft. He who does not know it uses bullets and will kill you that way. Why? Because you sent sickness. So I speak to you thus. Happy, in peace, do not quarrel. It is better.

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[754] The important aspect of witchcraft as a sanctioning procedure is in relation to the distribution of wealth in the community.

A man can accumulate a certain amount of money as long as [454] he is willing to share it with others and spend it in culturally accepted ways, such as buying cohetes for a fiesta, giving a house party for the Saint in the house altar and inviting many [186] villagers, etc. But he cannot simply save it without being accused of miserliness; spend it all in building too large or too different a house without being accused of being embarrassed of his Indianess (of which he should be proud); nor can he invest in businesses which are not the traditional economic activities of the Indian without the fierce criticism of his fellow villagers. There is, then, a top limit to the accumulation of wealth imposed not only by the environmental and technological factors, but by

626 556 the few economic alternatives offered to an Indian who wants to live an Indian life among other Indians, in peace. In this sense, Amatenangueros and Aguacatecos are no "penny capitalists" of the type described by Sol Tax (1953). But it is also true that, like the Panajachel Indians, they desire to have more for themselves and their children: money for security against sickness, death, [146] bad crops and other misfortunes. They also want better clothing, more meat in their diet (the amount of animal protein in their diet is extremely small by western standards) and small extra luxuries which have been introduced into their culture, little by little, by the local Ladino merchants: flashlights, mirrors, etc.

627 556 754 [731] Nevertheless, a wealthy man brings upon himself the antagonism of the other villagers, who, in search of a scapegoat during times of stress (such as a village epidemic) would not hesitate to accuse the rich man of being responsible for bringint the misfortune to the town because of his evil spirit, nor hesitate to kill him. Even if people find a man has a good crop, somebody can assume that, because his own crop failed, the other man has "stolen" the soul of his corn or if a man receives a large inheritance, somebody could accuse him of having killed (by witchcraft) the relative from who he inherited it. It takes a good deal of diplomatic skill and a strong control of the sources of gossip to manage to [753] keep oneself clear of such accusations. On the other hand, villagers are afraid of showing excessive wealth (according to community standards) unless they bring upon themselves the other face of witchcraft: supernatural sickness produced by envy. Even

629 556 754 a man in good standing, if he has too many goods or money, may fear witchcraft because he "knows" that he is a good target for the envy of those who, possessing powerful and evil souls (nahuales), decide to bewitch him and make him sick or kill his children or ruin his next crop.

626 754 Thus, the belief in witchcraft operates at two levels: on the one hand the individual lives according to community norms so that he won't be accused of being a witch. On the other hand he lives according to community norms so that he cannot be bewitched.

754 Because witches attack supernaturally, sending out their animal souls while their human body is asleep, it is not possible to know, for certain, the originator of the sickness nor to protect oneself or others from its powers. There are no sorcery spells to counteract it, but people "know" that witches can, sometimes, put "bad medicines" into drinks while a man is drunk or leave little sticks on the road for the victim to step on and acquire the disease which has been sent because of envy. Everybody denies knowing how to bewitch, but everybody suspects others of being able to do it.

[753] One result of this set of beliefs is that the etiology of disease is thought of as being supernatural. Other misfortunes are also explained in metaphysical terms. Sickness is always present in the village, misfortunes do occur which cannot be predicted, and the villager "experiences," then, the effects of witchcraft in everyday life. Therefore, the threat of supernatural

591 the head of the household, it is likely that the younger couple
592 will move to another house after the temporary service period. If a couple has a married daughter or son living in the house, they will not insist, when a second child marries, that the first couple remain in the unit. Apparently, the most efficient work group is a dyad, both for agricultural work and pottery making [428] (see below). The last child whether male or female will stay in [184] the home and inherit it after the parents' death. It is unlike Aguacatenango where the rule is that only a male child inherits the house.

591 The choice of which parents' household should be the residence of a new couple requires a separate decision for each particular case. The factors that determine the choice are (1) the economic condition of the parents of each spouse; (2) the presence or absence of other children in each spouse's family of orientation; and (3) the age of the couple.

[556] "A new couple will take up residence quarters with the parents who are economically better off, with more land and cattle" [693] (Nash, J., 1960:45). The second factor is related to the fact that [592] if a couple has married children living in the house who can help with the agricultural work and the making of pottery, they are not as anxious to keep their other children as members of the household labor force. The third factor is a personal, rather than a [582] standard, choice, because if a bride is very young at the time of marriage, "her mother may prevail upon the couple to stay in her home until later, even if the boy is working with his father and is to inherit his homestead" (Nash, J., 1960:45).

8: Hunt E-4,5 (1958)1962 NV9 Tzeltal NV9
Amatenango
Aguacatenango

184 (4) The reciprocal financial obligations between parents
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428 and children in Amatenango, and between parents and sons in Agua-
593 catenango, to support each other at different stages of the de-
velopmental cycle of their respective domestic groups affect the
rule of ultimogeniture.

184 (5) The relative wealth of the natal domestic group of
182 the spouse, measured by the amount of land controlled by the unit
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591 affects (a) the choice of marriage partner, and (b) the residence
556 of the newly married couple. In Aguacatenango, where residence
is normatively patri-virilocal, parents try to marry their
daughters within the same economic level of their own households.
In Amatenango, marriages occur across wealth lines, and the couple
reside with the parents of the spouse who are better off.

184 (6) The relative importance of men versus female co-
182 operative work groups, and/or the difference in structuring of
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476 work groups affects (a) the sibling bond; (b) the mother-daughter
593 bond; and (c) the mother-in-law-daughter-in-law bond.
[606] In Aguacatenango, where only men form cooperative work
groups, the brother-brother bond is stronger than the sister-
sister bond or the brother-sister bond.

In Amatenango, where both males and females form cooperative
[607] work groups, the multilateral sibling bond is reinforced to the
point of including siblings-in-law.

184 In Aguacatenango, economic rivalry between siblings tends
593 to disrupt the brother bond with constant conflict. Thus, relation-
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571 ships are more vertically oriented which is consistent with the
[613] presence of agnatic descent lines (in Amatenango, generational

182 571 (602) based on non-kinship terms would maximize profit or material benefits, which the kinship frame limits considerably. Second, 182 183 461 556 the cultural norms imposed on the villager about the types of work which he is allowed to perform, about the maximum wealth which he is able to control, and about the distribution of this wealth, are, from a purely financial point of view, "anti-economical." 156 177 But an Indian living in a Ladino town, undoubtedly having the choice of improving his life from an economic point of view, 156 626 556 alienates himself from everything which is dear to him. An Indian attempting to live up to his aspirations of wealth within the community, alienates himself even more, and risks the dangers of witchcraft and social ostracism.

121 The phrase, "man does not live by bread alone," is very much of a truism here. If the primary factor in determining behavior were economical, the villager would have no need to live within the customary standards of living of his community nor would the corporate community persist. Each Indian could become a laborer of some sort, and integrate himself into the national society of Mexico.

But people make choices not only because they are financially advantageous, but because they preserve their standing within their kinship group, they provide satisfaction for their need of the psychological rewards of prestige and positive affection and for their need for "belonging" to a group of similar human beings with similar culture and aspirations.

We have to admit, then, that it is as impossible to analyze social dynamics, only taking into account economic variables, as